The child as econometrician: a rational model of preference understanding in children. by Lucas, Christopher G et al.
UC Berkeley
UC Berkeley Previously Published Works
Title
The child as econometrician: a rational model of preference understanding in children.
Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/322892rg
Journal
PLoS One, 9(3)
Authors
Lucas, Christopher
Griffiths, Tom
Xu, Fei
et al.
Publication Date
2014
DOI
10.1371/journal.pone.0092160
 
Peer reviewed
eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library
University of California
The Child as Econometrician: A Rational Model of
Preference Understanding in Children
Christopher G. Lucas1*, Thomas L. Griffiths2, Fei Xu2, Christine Fawcett3, Alison Gopnik2, Tamar Kushnir4,
Lori Markson5, Jane Hu2
1 School of Informatics, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, United Kingdom, 2Department of Psychology, University of California, Berkeley, California, United States of
America, 3Department of Psychology, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden, 4Department of Human Development, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, United States of
America, 5Department of Psychology, Washington University in St. Louis, St. Louis, Missouri, United States of America
Abstract
Recent work has shown that young children can learn about preferences by observing the choices and emotional reactions
of other people, but there is no unified account of how this learning occurs. We show that a rational model, built on ideas
from economics and computer science, explains the behavior of children in several experiments, and offers new predictions
as well. First, we demonstrate that when children use statistical information to learn about preferences, their inferences
match the predictions of a simple econometric model. Next, we show that this same model can explain children’s ability to
learn that other people have preferences similar to or different from their own and use that knowledge to reason about the
desirability of hidden objects. Finally, we use the model to explain a developmental shift in preference understanding.
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Introduction
A variety of studies [1–3] indicate that very young children
make important inferences about the preferences and choices of
others, a crucial part of the development of a ‘‘theory of mind’’.
However, the mechanisms that lead to such inferences are not
clear. Developmental psychologists have suggested that children
use evidence from their social environment to learn about
preferences, but there has been no unified theory of how this
learning occurs.
When learning about other people’s preferences, adults rely on
several kinds of information, ranging from overt expressions of
pleasure or disgust, to subtler and less-direct information like the
quantity and features of the options that the agent did not choose.
Kushnir and colleagues [2] recently provided the first evidence
that preschoolers can use also indirect cues, including the statistical
properties of an agent’s options, as the basis for understanding that
agent’s preferences. In another line of research, Fawcett and
Markson [1] asked under what conditions children would use
shared preferences between themselves and another agent as the
basis for generalization. They found that children do not just use
shared preferences as the basis for generalization, but also consider
category membership. For example, given evidence that a person
shares their preferences for specific toys, children are more likely
to generalize a shared preference to novel toys than to novel foods.
Finally, Repacholi and Gopnik [3] conducted an experiment to
determine the age at which children come to understand that
people have different preferences and act accordingly. They
showed that 14-month-old children tend to offer other people the
items that they themselves prefer rather than the items that those
people have previously chosen, while 18-month-old children tend
to make offers that reflect the past choices of the offer’s recipient,
suggesting that children come to understand preferences as
person-specific mental states between those ages.
We present a rational model that explains these diverse results,
and makes new predictions that have recently been tested
empirically. Like other recent computational models of ‘‘theory
of mind’’ development (e.g., [4,5]), the model is based on the idea
that children implicitly consider hypotheses that represent others’
mental states or actions, and evaluate these hypotheses against
data in accordance with Bayes’ theorem. This model can be
reduced to a set of commitments about the beliefs that children
can entertain, the prior probabilities they implicitly assign to them,
and how those beliefs connect to observable events. We propose
that children assume that preferences are stable over time; that
children can understand preferences as applying not just to
individual objects, but to features or categories of objects; that
children see preferences as varying in strength, with stronger
preference for a feature leading to a greater probability of choosing
options with that feature; and that children understand that
choices can reflect both a preference for a chosen option and
dislike for alternatives. While there are multiple ways to represent
these commitments, we chose a specific model with origins in
econometrics, the Mixed Multinomial Logit [6], for its simplicity
and its widespread use in predicting choices in applied settings.
The MML represents preference in terms of the subjective utility
that different options provide the chooser, and assumes that
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choosers tend to make choices that maximize their utility. While
people may not always make utility-maximizing choices in daily
life, assuming that they do allows for a very good first pass at
inferring their preferences, whether you are a child or a marketing
researcher.
Our approach, realized through this model, provides a unified
account of what might otherwise appear to be quite varied data
across different studies, and accurately predicts new phenomena in
preference learning. Moreover, as is always true with rational
models, systematic deviations from the model are also informative
about the processes underlying learning and the assumptions that
children implicitly make.
Model
Our general approach will be to consider how a child might
optimally learn people’s preferences from their choices, in the
tradition of rational analysis [7]. A first step in such an analysis is
defining a model of choice that captures children’s assumptions
about how people’s preferences influence their actions. Given such
a choice model, we can apply Bayes’ rule to determine how an
agent would make optimal inferences from others’ behavior. Many
such models are possible, but we will start by drawing from past
research in psychology and economics that relates preferences and
choices.
One of the simplest types of choice model asserts that, when
faced with a set of options, people choose the one that they value
most. In determining the values of options, people combine the
values – or subjective utilities – of the features of those options,
including some features that are only visible (or salient) to
themselves. By imposing assumptions about how the utilities of
these hidden features are distributed, one can specify a relationship
between observable features, feature-specific utilities, and choice
probabilities [8]. One of the most common assumptions is that
hidden utilities follow a Gumbel distribution (or, in practice, a
normal distribution [9]), which leads to a choice rule in which
people are exponentially more likely to choose an option as its
observable features become more attractive [10]. This simple
choice rule is also commonplace in the psychological literature,
where it has been called the Luce-Shepard choice rule [11,12].
More formally, when presented with a set of J options with
utilities ~(u1, . . . ,uJ ), people will choose option i with proba-
bility proportional to exp(ui), with
P(c~iDu)~
exp(ui)P
j exp(uj)
, ð1Þ
where j ranges over the agent’s options. Given this choice rule,
learning about an agent’s preferences is a matter of applying
Bayes’ rule. Specifically, given an observed sequence of choices
c~(c1, . . . ,cN ), the posterior distribution over the utilities is:
p(uDc)~
P(cDu)p(u)Ð
P(cDu)p(u)du
, ð2Þ
where p(u) expresses the prior probability of a vector of utilities u.
The likelihood P(cDu) is the product of the probabilities of the
individual choices given by Equation 1, assuming that the choices
are independent given u. An option’s utility is just the sum of the
utilities of its features, so u~b0X, where X represents objects’
features and b represents the agent’s utilities for features. A final
assumption is that b is normally distributed, with variance given by
the parameter s2.
This combination of prior and likelihood function – discussed at
greater length in File S1 – corresponds to the Mixed Multinomial
Logit model (MML; [6]), which has been used for several decades
in econometrics to model discrete-choice preferences in popula-
tions of consumers. The MML and closely-related alternatives
have been used to understand people’s automobile ownership
decisions and transportation choices [13], their decisions about
telephone services and telephone use [14], and their choices of
high- versus lower-efficiency refrigerators [15]. The MML’s
widespread application is due in part to the theoretical underpin-
nings of its choice model: the Luce-Shepard choice rule reflects the
choice probabilities that result when agents seek to maximize their
utility, making certain assumptions about the distributions over
unobservable utilities [10], and is thus compatible with the
standard assumptions of statistical decision theory. Our adoption
of this model is driven in large part by its simplicity: given a
minimal set of commitments about what preferences are likely –
which we will detail later – we obtain a version of the MML that
has few free parameters, in some cases just one, allowing us to
compare model predictions to developmental data without being
concerned that our fits are merely due to using a highly flexible
model and choosing parameter values that happen to work.
Results
The model outlined above provides a rational answer to the
question of how to infer the preferences of an agent from his or her
choices. In the remainder of the paper, we explore how well this
answer accounts for the inferences that children make about
preferences, applying it to the key developmental phenomena
mentioned in the introduction as well as recent experiments
explicitly designed to test its predictions. Our aim is not to provide
an exact correspondence between model predictions and the
available data, but rather to show that a rational model explains
several phenomena with greater precision than do past accounts
that only address subsets of the available data. For example,
Kushnir et al. [2] argue that children use statistical information to
distinguish between random and non-random patterns of choices,
and use that information to learn about preferences. While that
explanation is consistent with their data, our model makes more
specific predictions about the patterns of children’s judgments,
explains generalization behavior in Fawcett & Markson’s [1]
results, and predicts inferences to graded preferences. Repacholi
and Gopnik [3], in discussing their own results, suggest that
children at 18 months see increasing evidence that their their
caregivers’ desires can conflict with their own. Our model is
consistent with this explanation, but provides a specific account of
how that evidence could produce a shift in inferences about new
individuals. Details of how we obtained our predictions can be
found in the Materials and Methods.
Using statistical information to infer preferences
An experiment conducted by Kushnir et al. [2] provides
evidence that children are sensitive to statistical information when
inferring the preferences of agents. In this study, 3- and 4-year-old
children saw one of three simple demonstrations. Each child was
shown a box of toys, with the specific mixture of toys varying
according to the experimental condition. In the 100% condition,
the box contained just one type of toy (e.g., red discs). In the 50%
condition, the box contained equal numbers of two types of toys
(e.g., red discs and blue plastic flowers). In the 18% condition, the
box contained two types of toys, but one toy was relatively rare
(e.g., 18% red discs and 82% blue plastic flowers). A squirrel
puppet, or ‘‘Squirrel’’, was introduced to each child. In all three
A Model of Preference Understanding in Children
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u
conditions, the puppet looked into the box and picked out five red
discs. The experimenter then placed three toys in front of the
child, including a red disc (the target), a blue plastic flower (the
alternative), and a yellow cylinder (the distractor). The child was
asked to select the object that Squirrel liked. The entire process
was repeated using a different set of objects. The children selected
the target (the red disc) 0.96, 1.29, and 1.67 times (out of 2) in the
100%, 50%, and 18% conditions, respectively, indicating that
children used the statistics of the puppet’s options to infer his
preferences.
Figure 1(a) compares the predictions of the model to the
children’s offer frequencies. The model’s mean squared error
(MSE) was .008 and the correlation between the model’s
predictions and mean child responses was r~:92. The model’s
only parameter is s2, which has little influence on fits to the data
(see File S1 for details). We found one notable difference between
model’s predictions and the children’s choices: children tended to
choose the target object more frequently than alternatives in the
100% condition, while the model sees the 100% events as
uninformative. While this mismatch may be an artifact – the
difference between participants’ choices and chance is not
statistically significant – it also has a plausible explanation under
our model: Squirrel could have done something other than select
toys from the box, that is, he was choosing the target over other
unobserved options. To test this idea, we included one other
unobserved option at each choice event, with features orthogonal
to the toys’ features. The resulting predictions matched partici-
pants’ offers more closely, yielding an MSE of :005 and a
correlation of r~:95. Figure 1(b) shows model predictions after
this modification. If this explanation is true, it yields a new
prediction: learners who see an agent making free choices should
show a bias toward offering target object in the 100% condition,
whereas in a control condition that makes it clear that the agent is
required to choose something, that bias should disappear.
Generalizing preferences to novel objects
Fawcett and Markson [1] went beyond asking children to learn
preferences from choices, to exploring how two-year-old children
solve the problem of using preference information to learn about
novel hidden objects. Their experiments began with four training
events, involving two actors (Actor 1 and Actor 2). At the start of
every training event, each actor brought out an object, where both
objects were members of the same category, e.g., food or toys. The
actors displayed opposite preferences from each other, with each
actor liking her own object and disliking the other object. Actor 1’s
objects were chosen to be consistently more interesting or desirable
to the child. After each actor reacted to the objects, the child was
given an opportunity to play with the objects, and his or her
preference for one object over the other was judged by
independent coders, based on relative interest in and play with
each object. Following the training events, the children saw a test
event in which each actor brought out an opaque container that
hid an object. The hidden objects were said to belong to the same
category as the training objects. Next, the actors reacted to the
hidden objects in a manner that varied by condition. In the positive
condition, each actor viewed the object and described it as her
favorite member of the category. In the negative condition, each
actor expressed dislike for her hidden object. In the indifferent
condition, the actors did not see the new objects and professed
ignorance about them. At the end of the test event, the child was
then given an opportunity to choose one hidden object for him or
herself. Finally, there was a second training event that differed
from the first in one respect: the hidden objects were members of a
different category from those seen in training. In Experiment 1,
members of the new category were broadly similar to the training
objects, e.g., books versus toys. In Experiment 2, the new category
was intended to be quite different, e.g., food.
Figure 2 shows the MML’s predictions and the rates at which
children chose Actor 1’s object. With s2~2:6 and twelve possible
features, the correlation between the predictions and the overall
choice rates was r~0:88. Predictive accuracy was generally
insensitive to the number of features – with 30 features, the
correlation dropped by only :01. Children’s choice proportions
were more extreme than the probabilities predicted by the model,
especially in the cases where children chose to play with one of
Actor 2’s objects during training. This could be because Actor 1’s
objects had features one would expect people to like a priori. Our
model could accommodate this by using a non-zero mean for prior
distribution on preferences. We could have achieved better fits by
modifying the model to assign higher utilities to Actor 1’s objects,
thereby reflecting the a priori attractiveness of those objects, but
that would have introduced an additional free parameter. Another
unanticipated result is that there was a weak trend in the negative
condition toward selecting Actor 1’s objects when the novel items
were different from the examples, versus similar. This can be seen
in Figure 2, in which the NS judgments tend to favor Actor 1 more
than the ND judgments. This difference did not significantly differ
from the model’s predictions or chance, and given the variability
of the children’s responses, might be due to (1) children choosing
hidden object in service of gaining information about the
experimenters’ reactions rather than obtaining the more attractive
option; or (2) failing to attend to the actors’ emotional reactions,
treating possession of the hidden objects as an implicit selection.
Both of these possibilities may warrant further study.
The developmental course of preference understanding
The next phenomenon we will consider is the developmental
difference found by Repacholi and Gopnik [3], who compared 14-
and 18-month-olds across two experimental conditions. In their
unmatched condition, each child saw an actor express pleasure after
tasting raw broccoli (which the children tended to dislike) and
disgust after eating goldfish crackers (which the children tended to
like). In the matched condition, the actor’s pattern of reactions was
reversed, matching the child’s own. After presenting these
reactions, the actor prompted the child to offer a food item by
asking ‘‘Can you give me some?’’ and holding out a hand. In the
unmatched condition, almost none (12.5 percent) of the younger
children’s offers matched the actor’s previous choice of broccoli,
while 69 percent of the older children’s offers were broccoli. In the
matched condition, where the actor chose the cracker, roughly equal
proportions of offers by younger and older matched the actor’s
choice (72 percent and 75.9 percent, respectively). They found that
between the ages of 14 and 18 months, children shift from offering
actors the foods that the children themselves prefer to offering the
foods that the actors previously selected. Repacholi and Gopnik
offered the explanation that children see conflict in desire as
evidence for preference differences. We will show that our
approach provides a more precise version of their account,
treating the developmental shift as the result of a rational
interpretation of the evidence that young children are likely to
observe. Given only a few observations, it may be rational for a
child to believe that everyone’s preferences are the same, or that
‘‘preferences’’ are merely recognition of the intrinsic goodness of
the available options, even when more numerous observations
with the same pattern support the belief that people have different
preferences. Shifting from one model to another in this way is a
consequence of the fact that simpler models tend to be more
probable than more complex models with similar accuracy.
A Model of Preference Understanding in Children
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Complex models, with larger numbers of parameters and the
flexibility to explain a wide range of possibilities, assign probability
to events not supported by observed data. Until enough events that
are improbable under the simpler model are observed, the more
complex one should be discounted. In the context of Bayesian
model selection, this effect is called the Bayesian Occam’s razor
[16].
In the case of preferences, the simpler model (Model 1) assumes
that all people have the same preferences, drawn from a normal
distribution with mean zero. The more flexible model (Model 2) is
the one we have been using: each person has a distinct set of
preferences, which are drawn from the same distribution. If a
learner sees choices made by people with distinct but similar
preferences, the simpler model can explain a small number of
choices well, as there is insufficient evidence to distinguish between
noise and individual differences. As the number of observed
choices grows, however, the simpler model will fail to account for
the subtle but increasingly reliable differences between individuals,
making it more and more likely that the flexible model is correct.
We believe that most young children find themselves in a situation
like this, because their preferences are broadly similar to those of
their caregivers and siblings, and it may take quite some time to
observe enough evidence to reveal individual differences.
As predicted by our simulations (described in the Materials and
Methods), smaller amounts of data favor the simpler model,
leading to the prediction that the actor has preferences like the
Figure 1. Model predictions and data for Kushnir, Xu, and Wellman’s study [2]. (A) Predicted and observed proportions of children’s offers
under the default model. (B) Predicted and observed proportions of offers under the assumption that squirrel can decline to choose any object. Error
bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0092160.g001
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child’s and is likely to want a cracker. As data accumulate there is
a shift toward the flexible model, leading to a higher probability
that the actor wants the broccoli, because the flexible model treats
the actor’s choice of broccoli over goldfish crackers as the only
event that is diagnostic of her preferences. The specific probabil-
ities are given in Figure 3(a), assuming that both models are
equally likely a priori.
The model makes another prediction: children who are in the
process of shifting between the two views of preferences should be
sensitive to the strength of evidence that the broccoli-choosing
actor likes broccoli. Specifically, if a learner assigns non-negligible
probability to both Model 1 and 2, then stronger evidence for a
broccoli preference on the part of the mismatched actor, e.g.,
more broccoli choices or choices in the face of more alternatives,
should lead to a stronger belief for a broccoli preference under
Model 2 as well as somewhat more evidence that Model 2 is
correct. In a study exploring this question, Ma and Xu [17] found
just such an effect, using an experimental design similar to that
used in Kushnir et al. [2]: 16-month-olds who saw an actor choose
a boring object six times when there were more numerous exciting
alternatives were more likely to later offer a boring toy over an
exciting one (44 percent of cases) than were 16-month-olds who
saw six choices where the boring toy was the only option (9 percent
of cases).
One prediction that is not reflected in Repacholi and Gopnik’s
results is that the probability of offering the goldfish will rise
initially, after a very small number of choice events, before falling
again. To understand this, note that when only a handful of non-
experimental choices have been observed, the events in the
experiment constitute a significant proportion of the total
evidence, which leads the flexible model to be favored. A possible
explanation for the lack of evidence for such a trend is that
Figure 2. Model predictions for data in Experiment 1 of Fawcett and Markson [1]. (A) Results for children who showed a preference for 4
interesting toys. (B) Results for children who only showed a preference for 3 of 4 toys. The first character for each pair of bars denotes whether the
actors showed a positive (P) reaction to the hidden toys versus a negative (N) reaction. The second character reflects whether the hidden object was
said to be in a similar (S) or different (D) category from those seen in training. P(choice~1) is the probability of selecting Actor 1’s novel object. Error
bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals. Cases where children had fewer than 4 chances to play with the training objects are excluded. For (A),
there were 17, 17, 11 and 11 participants in the PS, PD, NS, and ND groups, respectively. For (B), there were 26, 26, 32, and 32 participants in the PS,
PD, NS, and ND groups, respectively.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0092160.g002
Figure 3. Results of simulations of the unmatched condition from Repacholi and Gopnik [3]. Each line shows the mean across 15
simulations, with standard errors. In both plots, the upper dashed line marks the proportion of 14-month-olds who offered the actor goldfish over
broccoli (7 of 8), while the lower dashed line marks the proportion of 18-month-olds who did so (8 of 26), with standard errors. Plot (a) assumes equal
prior belief in each model, while (b) assumes that the simpler model has a prior probability of 0.9.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0092160.g003
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children are predisposed to believe that the simpler model is more
likely. Figure 3(b) shows the inferences that our simulations predict
in the case where the simpler model is believed to be correct with a
prior probability of 0.9. The resulting predictions are closer to the
proportions seen in children’s choices. Alternately, we may treat
this difference as a new prediction that could be tested using a
longitudinal replication of Repacholi and Gopnik’s study.
Testing new predictions: Learning graded preferences
In explaining their own results, Kushnir et al. [2] proposed that
children use statistical evidence to make a binary judgment of
whether or not an individual prefers an object. In contrast, the
MML model predicts that children are also sensitive to the
strength of a person’s preference. To test this prediction, Hu et al.
(unpublished data; manuscript under revision) conducted two
experiments studying 4-year-old children’s inferences to graded
preferences. In one experiment involving 31 preschoolers aged 44–
63 months, children watched a puppet choose toy A over toy C five
times. The puppet also chose between toys B and C 10 times,
choosing toy B 7 of 10 times. Though objects A and B were never
directly compared in the puppet’s demonstrations, 86% of
children successfully inferred that the puppet preferred toy A
(chosen in 100% of the trials it appeared in) over toy B (chosen in
70% of the trials in which it appeared). When asked to compare
objects A, B, and C to a novel object D, 82% of children inferred A
would be preferred over D, 57% inferred B would be preferred
over D, and only 36% inferred C would be preferred over D.
Children’s inferences suggest they used the consistency of the
puppet’s choices to determine the puppet’s preferences
(AwBwC), rather than the raw number of times each toy was
chosen. The MML predicts this result (MSE~:008, correlation
r~:99 with choice proportions; see Figure 4) because a large
number of choice events can provide compelling evidence that a
preference exists, but only consistent choices provide evidence that
an agent has a strong preference. More formally, numerous
choices favoring an option can strongly indicate that its features
have a positive subjective value, but the magnitude of that value
depends on choice consistency.
Discussion
Our goal has been to understand how children reason about the
preferences of other people, and to explain their ability to learn
from statistical evidence, generalize within and across categories,
and discover that other people have their own distinct preferences.
To that end, we used a model with roots in econometrics to see
what inferences a Bayesian learner might make in these
circumstances, making some simple assumptions about how
preferences relate to choices. This model’s predictions are
consistent with children’s judgments across a range of experimen-
tal conditions. In Kushnir et al. [2] and Fawcett and Markson [1],
the model predicts children’s sensitivity to the contexts of others’
choices, their inferences from others’ emotional responses, and
their generalizations across categories. The model also shows how
conceptual change in preference understanding is consistent with
Bayesian inference, adding to a growing body of literature
demonstrating that Bayesian methods provide elegant explana-
tions for conceptual change [18]. We will next address some
remaining issues, first discussing the appropriateness of describing
the MML as a rational model, then assessing some alternative
models of preference learning, and finally describing how our
findings relate to children’s theory of mind in general.
Rationality in decision making and alternative models
In the view of preference learning that we have proposed, it is
necessary to commit to a model of how preferences lead to choices,
reflecting a set of assumptions on the part of the child. To the
extent that ours is a rational analysis in the spirit of [7], those
assumptions must reflect the true structure of the environment.
While the choice model used in the MML is not descriptively
accurate under all conditions, we have found that it is largely
indistinguishable from alternatives in the contexts we have
considered, and that the most salient of these alternatives have
disadvantages that preclude their use as the basis for a rational
model, leaving the MML’s choice model as the best available
proxy for an ideal one. We tested an alternative approach based
on Tversky’s ‘‘Elimination by Aspects’’ (EBA) choice model [19],
and found that a straightforward version could not account for
many of the basic phenomena we observed. An extension of the
EBA-based model, incorporating numerous hidden features and
preferences, did not show these qualitative failures but still gave a
worse account of our data than the simpler MML. See File S1 for
details of these comparisons, as well as a discussion of other kinds
of models.
While other choice models might be used in place of the MML,
we do hold that several core assumptions of the MML are essential
to any appropriate choice model: preferences are largely stable,
though context-dependent factors might apply as well; preferences
Figure 4. Model predictions for Hu et al.’s experiment. Predicted probability that objects will be selected, plotted against observed
proportions, where A was chosen over C 7 of 10 times, B was chosen over C 5 of 5 times, and D was a novel alternative.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0092160.g004
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apply to choice categories or features, rather than just tokens; and
preferences are graduated, with stronger preferences leading to
higher choice probabilities.
Further novel predictions
The MML makes additional predictions which we hope to test
in future work. One prediction is that children can generalize
preferences on the basis of specific features in addition to category
membership: if an agent chooses diverse objects that are all red,
then children should infer that red objects are desirable to that
agent. A second prediction – which already has some support [17]
– is that experience determines the age at which children
understand that others have distinct preferences: children who
observe more disagreements should pass Repacholi and Gopnik’s
task earlier. This suggests the possibility of leading children to
earlier preference understanding with a training study. Developing
new experiments to test these predictions will complement the
work we have presented in this paper, providing a more complete
evaluation of the model we have described and new ways to
explore the richness of children’s preference understanding.
Modeling theory of mind
Before concluding, we will discuss how this work speaks to the
development of theory of mind in general. Most work using
probabilistic models has focused on children’s understanding of
physical causality, such as the action of blocks on machines. The
work we have presented, along with that of Goodman et al. [5]
and Seiver et al. [20], suggests that this kind of modeling can be
equally effective in helping us understand children’s developing
knowledge of psychological causality. In particular, inferring
preferences from choices underlies a wide range of more
sophisticated understandings of the mind such as the inference
of personality traits or intuitive judgments about the decisions of
others. We know that even infants understand that human action
is directed toward particular goals [21]. If children assume or learn
representations of preferences like those in the MML model early
in development, such assumptions could bootstrap a variety of
sophisticated abilities to learn about the minds of others.
Moreover, although much of the focus in the theory of mind
literature has been on belief states, it may be more important, from
an evolutionary point of view, for children to be able to infer the
desires and preferences of others.
Our model highlights the question of how children represent the
features of complex objects and events, which is a fundamental
issue not just in theory of mind, but cognitive development more
generally. Our results do not depend strongly on what features
children use to represent options, as long as those features reflect
inter- and intra-category similarity, but there might be cases where
different feature choices lead to dramatically different inferences.
For example, if an agent chooses options using a feature that is not
salient to children, they might make spurious inferences about the
attractiveness of other, correlated features. It is also possible that
children use statistical regularities, both across options and others’
choices, to determine what features to represent, in the vein of
[22].
This project is intended to be a step towards a general account
of theory of mind, one that addresses the human ability to learn
about diverse mental attributes including beliefs and goals as well
as preferences. With that aim in mind, it may be fruitful to explore
the connections between our work and that of Baker et al. [4,23],
which explains how people infer goals and beliefs from sequences
of actions and information about what an agent can observe. An
extension to their model to represent preferences – via the MML –
could explain a wide range of mental state attributions and the
sources of information that drive them.
Conclusion
Recent studies have shown that young children have a rich
understanding of the relationship between preferences and
choices. Not only do children think of other people as having
their own idiosyncratic likes and dislikes, but children can learn
about those preferences, not just from people’s overt reactions to
options, but from the contexts in which choices are made.
Moreover, children can generalize preferences to new objects in a
way that is sensitive to category membership, even when those new
objects are hidden.
Taken together, this evidence provides a foundation on which to
build a general account of preference learning. We have offered
such an account, using a model borrowed from economics. It rests
on the simple assumption that, in the mind of the learner, people
pick options with the greatest subjective utility. This model
explains children’s talents in learning and generalizing from
preferences, and shows that we can understand a developmental
transition – in which children begin to recognize the idiosyncratic
nature of preferences – as the result of a rational inference. In
addition to explaining results from three separate papers and
making predictions that are supported by a fourth, our model
provides the first systematic approach to understanding preference
learning in children, offers new predictions, and provides a bridge
to other new research into children’s theory of mind.
Materials and Methods
Ethics Statement
All of the studies described in this paper were approved by
institutional review boards at the University of California, Berkeley
or the University of Michigan. All participation was voluntary,
with informed consent obtained from parents in writing.
Predictions for Kushnir et al. and Hu et al.
In Kushnir et al.’s experiments, children were asked to pick out
the toy that Squirrel prefers, having observed that Squirrel chose a
target object such as a red circle five times, from a pool of objects
that included instances of the target object and an alternate object
such as blue flowers. We can decompose this task into learning
about Squirrel’s preferences and using that knowledge to offer an
object. Squirrel’s choices reveal his preferences via their
likelihoods: if his choices c are much more likely given a strong
preference b for the target object, then a strong preference is more
probable, via Bayes’ rule:
p(bDc,X)!P(cDb,X)p(b), ð3Þ
where X represents the options’ features. In the 100% condition,
where the target object constitutes all of Squirrel’s options,
Squirrel’s preferences do not determine the likelihood of his
choices – he must choose the target, regardless of what he likes – so
no conclusions can be drawn from the choices the child sees. In the
50% condition, the pattern of choices is more likely given a
preference for the target object, because if Squirrel were
indifferent to the different kinds of objects, he would choose one
at random at each opportunity, so the likelihood of the actual
events is 0:55, while a Squirrel with a strong preference should
make those choices with high probability. This difference in
likelihood is even more pronounced in the 18% condition, where
the probability that an indifferent Squirrel would choose the target
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object five times is 0:185. Note that indifference and strong
preference are just two cases in the continuous range of preference
that the MML can represent, and it assigns probabilities to all
possible preferences over the observed objects or features.
Having learned about Squirrel’s preferences, the child must now
select an object to give Squirrel from a set consisting of one target
object, one alternative object that was among Squirrel’s options in
the 50% and 18% conditions, and one novel distractor object. If
we suppose each child is choosing as Squirrel would, we can use
the Luce-Shepard choice rule (Equation 1) to predict the rates at
which children should choose the different objects for a particular
set of preference values, and average over preference values to
predict how often they should choose each item.
The same logic applies to Hu et al.’s studies, with each
perceptually distinct object category having one distinct feature,
and the numbers of options and observed choices matching those
in Hu et al.’s experimental design.
Predictions for Fawcett and Markson
In Fawcett and Markson’s task, children selected hidden objects
based on actors’ expressions of dislike or declaring the object to be
their favorite, the actors’ earlier choices, and the category of the
hidden objects. Actor 1 consistently chose attractive objects, Actor
2 consistently chose unattractive objects, and the category of the
hidden objects was either similar to or different from that of the
actors’ earlier options. The generalization involved in this task
requires two kinds of inferences. The first inference, to the actors’
preferences based on their choices between the four pairs of boring
and fun objects, is the same as the inference necessary in Kushnir
et al.’s tasks. The second inference, to the hidden objects’ features
based on the actors’ inferred preferences and their reactions, is
somewhat different: rather than choosing objects, the actors gave
emotional responses to them, and children had information about
the object’s category, constraining its possible features.
In applying our model to this task, we accepted the actors’
statements at face value, taking expressions of dislike to mean an
option’s utility must be less than zero, and taking ‘‘my favorite’’ to
mean an object must have the highest possible utility for its
category. For the hidden objects’ features, we assumed that each
object has a set of category-specific features as well as features that
span multiple categories. See File S1 for details.
The result of these two inferences is a distribution over the
possible features of the two hidden objects, which we can translate
into predictions about the child’s choices once we know about the
child’s own preferences. Rather than making assumptions about
the child’s preferences, we use the child’s choices over the original
objects to infer his or her preference, again using the MML model.
As discussed below, we might have used an informative prior
(assuming children are more likely to prefer the interesting objects)
to improve the fit of our model, but this would have come at the
cost of introducing additional free parameters. See File S1 for
details on both inference steps.
Simulations for Repacholi and Gopnik
In modeling the developmental shift discovered by Repacholi
and Gopnik, we assume that the child observes her own choices
and those of her parent and a sibling. The preferences underlying
those choices are given in Table S2 in File S1, as are the features
we chose for the different food options, four of which are available
at any choice event. We chose the options and features
heuristically, with the aim that they be consistent with the
preferences about foods exhibited by adults and children [24]. We
do not assume that the child has direct access to her own
preferences, but we account for the fact that she observes many
more of her own choices than those of others by supposing she sees
ten times as many of her own choices as choices by the other
agents. The overall pattern of results is unchanged if we assume
the child has direct knowledge of her own preferences (see File S1
for details).
Using these data, we can determine how a rational learner’s
predictions about a new broccoli-choosing actor’s preferences
should change over time: as the learner observes more choices, her
adoption of a simpler model (m1) versus a more flexible model (m2)
will change, as will her beliefs about what preferences agents
should have under each model, leading to different predictions
about the probability that the new agent should pick broccoli over
goldfish, or vice versa. Formally, if m[fm1,m2g denotes the model,
d denotes the available data – choices observed along with agent
identities and features of options – and c denotes the actor’s next
choice, then
P(c~broccoliDd)~
X
m[fm1,m2g
P(c~broccoliDm,d)p(mDd) ð4Þ
where P(c~broccoliDm~m2,d) reflects only the new actor’s
previous broccoli selection because all agents have independent
preferences under Model 2. In contrast, P(C~broccoliDm~m1,d)
considers every choice event as if it had come from a single agent,
so the probability of the actor choosing broccoli again will be
dominated by the child’s own preferences, which are responsible
for most of the observed events. The posterior probability of model
m, p(mDd), is proportional to P(d Dm)P(m) (see File S1 for details).
Supporting Information
File S1 Combined supporting information. Contains a
more detailed description of the MML model, details of its
application to the experiments we have considered, and a
discussion of alternatives to the Luce-Shepard choice model.
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